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NOTES
Labor—Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter
XI Arrangement Proceedings —Iron Workers Local 455 v. Kevin Steel
Products, Inc.' and Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. REA Express,
Inc. 2 —Kevin Steel Products, Inc. (Kevin Steel or the Company), a
steel fabricator and erector, and a debtor-in-possession in Chapter NI 3
arrangement proceedings, sought to reject a collective bargaining
agreement with Shopmen's Local 455, International Association of
Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers (the Union). The
Company argued that the agreement was an onerous "executory con-
tract" under section 313(04 of the Bankruptcy Act. 5 The bankruptcy
court granted the Company's petition.° On appeal by the Union' the
district court reversed," concluding that section 77(n) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act," which prohibits any bankruptcy judge or trustee from
changing the wages or working conditions of railroad employees ex-
cept in accordance with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, evi-
denced a generalized Congressional intent to distinguish collective
bargaining agreements as-a class from those contracts which may be
cancelled under section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act.'" The absence
of a specific exception for industrial labor was "explainable as legisla-
tive oversight.""
Kevin Steel appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit which reversed the district court and HELD: Sec-
tion 313(l) permits the bankruptcy judge, after a careful weighing of
the equities on both sides, to authorize the rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement in Chapter XI arrangement proceedings." The
' 519 F.2d 698, 89 L.R.R.M. 3133 (2d Cir, 1975).
1 523 F.2d 164, 90 L.R.R.M. 2579 (2d Cir. 1975). The Unions' separate petitions
for certiorari were denied. 44 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1975) (Brotherhood of Rail-
way Clerks). 44 U.S.L.W. 3412 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1976) (International Association of
Machinists).
Bankruptcy Act ** 301-399, 11 U.S,C. ** 701-99 (1970).
4 11 U.S.C. § 713(1) (1970) provides in relevant part: "Upon the filing of a peti-
tion, the court may (1) permit the rejection of executory contracts of the debtor,
upon notice to the parties to such contracts and to such other parties in interest as the
court may designate ......
3 519 F.2d at 700, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3134.
re Kevin Steel Prods., :inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. if
65,159, at 74,825 (S.D.N,Y, 1974),
Appeal to the district court was taken pursuant to Bankruptcy Act § 39, l I
U.S.C. § 67(c) (1970); Bankruptcy Rules 801-814.
" Iron Workers Local 455'v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 381 F. Stipp. 336, 339, 87
L.R.R.M. 2311, 2313 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" 11 U.S.C,	 205(n) (1970).
'" 381 F. Supp, at 338, 87	 at 2313.
"
t 2 The Second Circuit consolidated Kevin Steel's appeal with the National Labor
Relations Board's (NLRB) petition for enforcement of its order resolving unfair labor
practice charges brought by the Union against Kevin Steel. 519 F.2d at 701, 89
L.R.R.M. at 3134. The NLRB Ibund the Company had violated sections 8(a)(1), (3) and
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court first found that such collective bargaining agreements are en-
compassed in the broad language of section 3l3(1) which permits the
rejection of "executory contracts." According nearly literal application
to section 313(1), the court. relied primarily on the breadth of the
statutory language" together with the congressional failure to carve
out. an exception for industrial labor despite the frequent opportunity
to do so." The court. also determined that it should not extend sec-
tion 77(n)'s special treatment of railroad labor contracts to cover all
collective bargaining agreements because railroad employees often re-
ceived special treatment in recognition of their importance to the na-
tional economy."' Since section 77(n) showed "that Congress knew
how to remove labor agreements from the scope of a general power
to reject executory contracts," the absence of a similar provision for all
labor contracts indicated that Congress intended to authorize the re-
jection of ordinary collective bargaining agreements."
The court also concluded that section 313(1) need not give way
to the terms of section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act" in
order to avoid a direct conflict between the Bankruptcy and Labor
At:B. 18 I nstead,  the court concluded that the effect of the two statutes
could be reconciled."' Section 8(d) was designed to prevent the unilat-
(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (5) (1970),
by inducing an employee to abandon the Union, by illegally discharging employees and
by refusing to execute the alinementioned collective bargaining agreement. Kevin Steel
Prods., Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. 493, 499, 86 11....R.R.N1, 1361. 1361-62 (1974). When Kevin
Steel failed to comply, the Board applied to the Second Circuit for enforcement or its
nyder. The court's holding clearly precluded any enforcement of the section 8(a)(5)
portion of the NLRB's order which had been held in abeyance pending the outcome of
the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 701, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3134.
ln view of the partial consent judgment entered with respect to the Board's peti-
tion ro.. enhircement, the court 111 oted it was not deciding whether the debtor must
reinstate discriminatorily discharged employees with back pay; nor was it dealing with
the status of monetary claims for pre-bankruptcy violations of the Labor Act. hi. at 706
11.20, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3138 n.20,
"Id. at 703, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3136.
' 4 Id. at 705, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3138.
IN Id.
'" Ste id. at 704-05, 89 L.R.R.N1. at 3137-38.
' 7 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). Under § 8(d), no "party" to a collective bargaining
agreement
shall terminate or moclify such contract, unless the party desiring such
termination or modification—
(I) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract ...
(2) offers to meet and conlr with the other party 6.ir the purpose
of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed
modifications:
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within
thirty days ...
(4) continues in lull force and effect ... all the terms and conditions
or the existing contract for it period of sixty clays after such notice is
given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs
later ,
519 F.2d at 704, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3137.
"Id. at 700, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3133-34.
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eral termination of collective bargaining agreements. However, its re-
strictions on their termination and modification are directed to "par-
ties" of the collective bargaining agreement." The court found that
the debtor-in-possession, until it assumed the old collective bargaining
agreement or made a new one, was not a "party" subject to section
8(d)." The court reasoned that the debtor-in-possession was instead a
new legal. entity with obligations possibly analogous to those of a suc-
cessor employer." Since a successor employer "is generally not hound
by the existing labor agreement,"" the court suggested that the
debtor-in-possession likewise should not be bound to the agreement.
Instead, the obligations of the debtor-in-possession should be merely
to bargain with the representative of the majority of its employees
and, once it signed an agreement with the Union then to comply with
the Labor Act."
The court did recognize that even though there was no direct
conflict between the terms of the Labor and Bankruptcy Acts, the
policies behind the two statutes were different." Nevertheless, the
court found unpersuasive the Union's policy argument that bank-
ruptcy proceedings would become a vehicle for the rejection of
troublesome collective bargaining agreements." Instead, the court
found ample inhibition to such abuse in the harsh consequences of
bankruptcy and the practical need for businesses to make the best
labor bargain possible to survive."
The court then remanded to the district court for a determina-
tion of whether the bankruptcy court had properly exercised the au-
thority to reject the collective bargaining agreement." For a standard
on remand, the court appeared to approve that advanced by the
Union which necessitated a showing of several factors, including
proper motivation and "convincing proof of both the Company's fi-
nancial condition" and the benefit to be gained by cancelling the
contract." In addition, the court noted that the district court should
scrutinize the bankruptcy judge's exercise of discretion to determine
that the balance of the equities clearly favored rejection. 3 °
Four weeks later, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
followed the Kevin Steel rationale in Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v.
REA Express, Inc. 31 In this case, REA Express, Inc. (REA), a corpora-
tion engaged in the surface and air transport of express shipments,
2 ° Section 8(d) is quoted at note 17 supra.




" Id. at 706, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3138.
24 /d. at 705-06, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3138.
" Id. at 706, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3138.
" Id. at 706, 707, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3139, 3140.
" Id. at 707, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3139.
" Id.
31
 523 F.2d at 164, 90 L.R.R.M, 2579 (2d Cir. 1975).
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and a debtor-in-possession in Chapter XI arrangement proceedings,
sought under section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act to reject two col-
lective bargaining agreements. 32 Both of the collective bargaining
agreements were subject to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act
(RLA), 33 which prohibit any carrier, including, inter alia, a debtor-in-
possession of a carrier" from rejecting a collective bargaining agree-
ment without following a protracted statutory procedure. 35 The bank-
ruptcy court denied permission to reject the labor contracts" but was
reversed immediately by the district court. 37
On appeal by the Unions, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit HELD: A bankruptcy court may authorize the rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement under section 313(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act where withholding such permission would thwart the
economic rehabilitation of a failing carrier." The court sought to rec-
oncile the apparent conflict in the terms of the RLA and the Bank-
ruptcy Act in accordance with the underlying policies of the statutes. 3 "
The RLA was designed to keep labor disputes from disrupting com-
merce by requiring carriers to continue operations pending
negotiations." Although the debtor-in-possession, as a "carrier," was
literally required to follow the Act's negotiation procedure, the court
determined that. requiring such negotiation would be futile in the case
of a carrier without sufficient resources to maintain the status quo.'"
Forcing it to adhere to the existing collective bargaining agreement
would simply trigger its collapse, thereby causing the very economic
disruption which the RLA sought to avert.'" Thus, the court deter-
mined that the Bankruptcy Act should govern where the carrier had
insufficient resources to continue operations indefinitely at existing
levels and labor costs pending negotiation.'"
After thus reconciling the effect of the two statutes, the court
" 1 Id. at 166-67, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2580,
45 u.s.c. §§ 151-188 (1970).
" 4 1d. § 151.
523 F.2d at 168, 90 I.„R.R.M. at 2581. 45 U.S.C. § 152 Seventh (1970) pro-
vides:
"No carrier	 shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions
or its employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in ihe man-
ner prescribed in such agreements or in section 156 of this title."
45 U.S.C. § 156 (1970) sets out procedures for negotiation of contract changes under
the auspices of the National Mediation Board and specifies that, pending the exhaus-
tion of these procedures, "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered
by the carrier ...."
a 523 17 .2d at 167, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2580.
" REA Express, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 89 L.R.R.M. 2495. 2496
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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sought to define the specific obligations of the debtor-in-possession.
Citing Kevin Steel, the court determined that the debtor-in-possession,
as a "new juridical entity," was not bound by the terms of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 44
 Although obligated to bargain collec-
tively with the representative of the majority of his employees,'" the
debtor-in-possession did not have to adhere to terms presently in ef-
fect pending negotiations." For this proposition, the court relied on
NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.," where the Supreme
Court held that a successor employer was not obligated to adhere to
the predecessor's contract pending negotiations." The court sug-
gested that the Burns principles, which favor granting to the new em-
ployer the freedom to alter labor arrangements in order to avoid in-
hibiting the free flow of capital, were particularly appropriate where
the debtor-in-possession was seeking to rehabilitate an enterprise as in
the Chapter XI situation." In effect, then, the debtor-in-possession's
sole obligation to the employees of the debtor was to bargain collec-
tively.
Finally, as in Kevin Steel, the court remanded for a consideration
of whether the bankruptcy court correctly found the contracts suffi-
ciently onerous to warrant rejection. 50 The Second Circuit indicated
that the bankruptcy court should cancel collective bargaining agree-
ments only where the alternative was the collapse of the carrier.'"
Kevin Steel and REA Express are the first cases to reach the appel-
late level which deal with the rejection of collective bargaining agree-
ments in bankruptcy proceedings. 52 This note will examine the con-
clusion that the debtor-in-possession is not bound by the termination
restrictions of the relevant labor legislation, as a "party" under the
NLRA in Kevin Steel or as a "carrier" under the RLA in REA Express.
As part of this examination, it will consider whether the duties of the
debtor-in-possession are, in fact, analogous to those of a successor
employer. The note will then focus on section 313(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act to determine whether it clearly authorizes the rejection of
44 Id. at 170, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2582-83.
45 Id. at 170, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2583.
48 Id. at 1 ,71, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2584.
" 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
4 '1d. at 287-91.
49 523 F.2d at 170, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2583.
2° Id. at 172, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2584-85.
41 Id. at 172, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2584.
42 With one exception, all of the district courts confronting the issue have deter-
mined that the Bankruptcy Act authorizes the rejection of collective bargaining agree-
ments. No district court has thereafter refused to reject a labor contract as a result of
finding it insufficiently burdensome. See In re Business Supplies Corp. of America, 72
CCH Lab. Cas. 9 13,940, at 27,978 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Carpenters Local 2746 v. Turney
Wood Prods., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 143, 149, 69 L.R.R.M. 2977, 2981 (W.D. Ark. 1968);
In re Klaber Bros., 173 F. Supp. 83, 85, 44 L.R.R.M. 2176, 2177 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). In In
re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 360, 58 L.R.R.M. 2427, 2428
(E.D.N.Y. 1965), the court held that collective bargaining agreements subject to the
Railway Labor Act could not be rejected in bankruptcy. See discussion at note 87 infra.
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collective bargaining agreements as "executory contracts." In attempt-
ing to identify congressional intent, the note will examine the statu-
tory language and the import of section 77(n), which prevents a bank-
ruptcy court from changing the wages and working conditions of rail-
road employees except in accordance with the terms of the RLA. Fi-
nally, three possible resolutions of the labor-bankruptcy policy conflict
will be considered: (1) requiring the debtor-in-possession to arbitrate
the extent to which it should be bound under the debtor's collective
bargaining agreement; (2) re-examining the rule which requires con-
tracts to be either assumed or rejected in toto under section 313(1);
and (3) imposing a test to determine those situations in which the
bankruptcy court should exercise its discretion to permit the rejection
of collective bargaining agreements under section 313(1). The note
concludes that the first alternative, requiring arbitration, best protects
the rights of labor unions without conflicting with the policies or clear
intent of the Bankruptcy Act.
1. THE STATUS OF THIS DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION
A. The Debtor-in-Possession as a "Party" Under the NLRA
Under section 8(d) of the NLRA, a "party" to a collective bar-
gaining agreement shall not terminate or modify an existing collective
bargaining agreement without complying with the negotiation proce-
dure specified in the Act." Thus, the unilateral rejection of a labor
agreement tinder section 313 (1) of the Bankruptcy Act constitutes a
clear violation of the NLRA, unless it can be said that the debtor-in-
possession is not a "party" to the debtor's collective bargaining agree-
ments. The Kevin Steel court concluded that the debtor-in-possession
was "not the same entity as the pre-bankruptcy company."' There-
fore, it was not a party to any labor agreement with the Union until it
assumed the old agreement or made a new one. 55 The court thus
sidestepped any direct conflict between the Labor and Bankruptcy
Acts.
Analysis of the court's conclusion requires an examination of the
status of a debtor-in-possession during an arrangement. Arrange-
ments tinder Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act are designed to re-
habilitate the debtor." Chapter XL provides corporations and indi-
viduals with procedures, short of bankruptcy, for applying their assets
53 Section 8(d) is quoted at note 17 supra.
" 519 F.2d at 704, 89 L.R,R.M. at 3137,
55 Id. It might appear that once the court had decided that the debtor-in-
possession was not a "party" to the collective bargaining agreement, there was no need
to determine whether it could reject the labor agreement under section 313(1). How-
ever, if the term of the collective bargaining' agreement continued beyond the term of
the arrangement, it seems that the debtor, qua debtor, would be required, as a party, to
reassume the collective bargaining agreement. This would defeat the purposes of the
arrangement.
5" Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 1187 (1966).
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equitably to unsecured debts. The debtor files a petition proposing an
arrangement" which, when accepted in writing by all the creditors af-
fected, may be confirmed by the court. 5H The confirmation of an ar-
rangement discharges the debtor from the debts provided for by the
arrangement5" and is binding upon all the creditors of a debtor."
During the arrangement proceedings, the court has exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the debtor and his property."'
An arrangement also may provide for the continuation of the
debtor's business." In such a case, the debtor continues in possession
of his business assets if no receiver or trustee is appointed. 63 The role
of the debtor-in-possession is multifaceted. He is a custodian of prop-
erty under the court's control" and hence analogous to a receiver,
trustee or other court officer. 65 As such, he cannot continue to oper-
ate the business, 66 lease or sell property" or borrow money" without
specific authorization from the court. He also has the duty to report
to the court on his management of the business" and he is not enti-
tled to divert any income from the operation of the business to his
own use. 7"
His position as a court officer also accords him rights he did not
have as a debtor. He can defend suits brought by creditors in which
the judgment debtor has defaulted" and acquire property free of
secured creditors' liens which would have been binding on the
debtor. 72 In addition to his rights and duties as a court officer, the
debtor-in-possession is also a trustee acting in the debtor's interest and
thereby is vested with various property rights and rights of action
which the debtor may have had." Finally, the debtor-in-possession is a
representative of the creditors. For example, he may object to the al-
57 Bankruptcy Act § 321, 11 U.S.C. § 721 (1970) (in a pending bankruptcy pro-
ceeding); id. § 322, 11 U.S.C. § 722 (if no bankruptcy proceeding is pending).
5" Id. § 361, 11 U.S.C. § 761.
5 " Id. § 37 I , II U.S.C. § 771.
"Id. § 367(1), 11 U.S.C. § 767(1).
°' Id. § 311, II U.S.C.§ 711.
"Id. § 357(5), 11 U.S.C. § 757(5).
" 3 /d. § 342, 11 U.S.C. § 742.
04 Id.
" Schokbeton Indus., Inc. v. Schokbeton Prods. Corp., 466 F.2d 171, 174-75 (5th
Cir. 1972).
" Bankruptcy Act § 343, 11 U.S.C. § 743 (1970).
4' 1 /d. § 313(2), 11 U.S.C. § 713(2).
"" Id. § 344, 11 U.S.C. § 744.
"lb Id. § 343, 11 U.S.C. § 743.
7" In re Austin, 55 F. Supp. 462, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1944).
Cramil Weaving Corp. v. Raindeer Fabrics, Inc., 185 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir.
1950).
7° In re Sequential Information Sys., Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L.
Rcp.1 63,848, at 73,404 (1970).
"See American Express Warehousing, Lid. v. Trans-America Ins. Co.,
[1962-1966 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep, 1 61,359, at 69,993 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
198
NOTES
lowance of improper claims." He is charged generally with the duty
of administering the business primarily for the benefit of the
creditors, 75
 and they may require him to exercise his powers for their
benefit."
Thus, it seems clear that the debtor-in-possession is not the same
legal entity as the pre-bankruptcy employer. However, because courts
will not allow an employer to escape his labor obligations by undergo-
ing a technical change in identity, legal identity may not be the correct
test for identifying "parties" bound by section 8(d). For example,
where one employer, though a separate legal entity, is, in fact, the
alter ego of another, it may be found to have assumed the other's ob-
ligations under a collective bargaining agreement. 77
Therefore, the validity of Kevin Steel's conclusion depends on
whether the rights, duties, and powers of a debtor-in-possession are
sufficiently different from those of the debtor to warrant the finding
that the debtor-in-possession is a different economic entity, and not
simply the beneficiary of a purely paper transaction. This argument.
becomes most difficult where the employer emerges from the ar-
rangement with management, control and operations intact.'"
Nevertheless, the court's conclusion appears correct in view of the
dual status of the debtor-in-possession as agent of the creditors and
bankruptcy court. At the same time, however, the court's focus on the
" American Anthracite & Bituminous Coal Corp. v. Leonardo Arrivabene, S.A.,
280 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1960).
76 in re Austin, 55 F. Stipp. 462, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1944).
76 8 0.n.t.IER oN BANKRUPTCV, 9 6.32[ 1), at 929 (14th ed. 1975).
77 Oilfield Maintenance Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1384, 1387, 53 L.R.R.M. 1235, 1238
(1963). The Board's conclusion that a construction company established to lake over the
business of another construction firm was the alter ego of its predecessor rested on
-findings that (I) both companies were owned and controlled by the same persons, (2)
the business of the predecessor was carried on without a break by the other company
who serviced the same customers, and (3) both firms had the same personnel. 142
N.L.R.B. at 1385, 53 L.R.R.M. at 1237. Cf. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 406 U.S.
272 (1972), where the Court noted that "in a variety or circumstances involving a
merger. stock acquisition, reorganization or assets purchase[,] [tihe Board might prop-
erly find as a matter of fact that the successor has assumed the obligations under the
old contract." hi. at 291.
There is some suggestion that the debtor-in-possession will be deemed a "dis-
guised continuance" of the debtor for the purpose of remedying the debtor's unfair
labor practices. See NLRB v, Coal Creek Coal Co., 204 F.2d 579, 580, 32 L.R,R.M.
2098, '2099 (10th Cir. 1953). This equation of the debtor and the debtor-in-possession
would not necessarily be controlling in the section 8(d) context. The law of the labor
contract ii as a fu nction and development quite separate from the law of unfair labor
practices. Morris Sc Gaus, Successorship and the Collective Bargaining Agreement:
Accommodating Wiley and Burns, 59 VA. L. R•v. 1359, 1364 (1973). Kevin Steel expressly
noted that it did not decide whether the debtor-in-possession must remedy the debtor's
unfair labor practices. 519 F.2d at 706 n.20, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3138 n.20.
78
 Title to its assets revests in the debtor upon confirmation of the arrangement,
in re Gelardin, Inc., 41 F. Stipp. 17 (E.D.N.Y. 1941), unless the court retains jurisdic-
tion not only of the debtor but also of its assets. In re Irving Electrical Supply Co., 4l F.
Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), affd sub nom. Vogel v. Mohawk Electric Sales Co., 126 F.2d
759 (2d Cir. 1942).
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"party" status of the debtor-in-possession seems unfortunate. It binds
the court to view his obligations in extreme terms—the debtor-in-
possession either was or was not a party to the entire agreement." This
approach limits the court's ability to consider the possibility of binding
the debtor-in-possession in a more limited way, for example, by re-
quiring him to arbitrate the issue of the extent to which he should be
bound under the debtor's collective bargaining agreement.
B. The Debtor- in-Possession as a "Carrier" Under the RLA
The debtor-in-possession is clearly a "carrier" subject to the
RLA. Section 1 of the RLA defines "carrier" as including "any re-
ceiver, trustee, or other individual or body, judicial or otherwise,
when in the possession of the business of any such 'carrier' ....""
The Railway Labor Act, section 2 Seventh, subjects any "carrier, its of-
ficers, or agents"g' to the Act's comprehensive restrictions" on con-
tract termination. Thus, under the literal language of the RLA, the
debtor-in-possession in REA Express, as a judicial entity in possession
of the business of a carrier was bound to exhaust the protracted
statutory procedures for resolving disputes over proposed changes in
a collective bargaining agreement. The bankruptcy court, which au-
thorized the rejection of REA's labor contracts therefore acted in di-
rect conflict with the express terms of the RLA.
In REA Express, the court resolved the literal conflict by examin-
ing the underlying policies of the two statutes and concluded that re-
fusing to allow the rejection of collective bargaining agreements in
bankruptcy actually defeated the central purpose of the RLA." The
futility of forcing a carrier to negotiate where it lacked the resources
to maintain the status quo pending negotiation and the consequent
collapse of a carrier forced to assume a collective bargaining agree-
ment would cause the very economic disruption which the RLA
sought to avert. 84 Thus, as in Kevin Steel," the court in REA Express
concluded that the debtor-in-possession was not subject to the termi-
nation restrictions of the relevant labor legislation." Ironically, how-
ever, the Kevin Steel court reached that result through a narrow in-
terpretation of the statutory language largely to the exclusion of con-
sideration of the conflicting policies. In REA Express, by contrast, the
court stressed policy considerations to avoid binding the debtor-in-
possession to a clearly applicable statutory term.
The court's holding, in addition to contravening the plain statu-
See 519 F.2d at 704, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3137.
45 U.S.C. § 151 First (1970).
" Id. § 152 Seventh.
" Id. § 156.
5" 523 F.2d at 169, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2582.
" 4 Id.
"5 519 F.2d at 704, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3137.
" 523 F.2d at 168-69, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2581-82.
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tory language," is not consistent with relevant case law. Courts not
only have refused to find the RLA unworkable in the reorganization
context, but also have required exhaustion of its procedures in the
resolution of disputes growing out of carrier's collective bargaining
agreements not rejected by a receiver" or trustee." REA Express
sought to distinguish this type of case on the ground that the receiver
who implicitly assumed the carrier's labor agreement thereby became
a party bound by its terms." However, this distinction is irrelevant in
the RLA context, where the receiver (or debtor-in-possession), already
a "carrier," undertakes no additional Obligations by conforming to the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement without disaffirmance."
Moreover, the courts' resolution of an analogous situation sug-
gests that the court too quickly acceeded to the carrier's plea for rejec-
tion of the entire collective bargaining agreement. REA claimed that it
could not possibly comply with the RLA's directive to maintain the
status quo pending exhaustion of the statutory procedure because it
could not continue to operate without drastic curtailment and consoli-
dation of its operations. 92 Similarly, carriers who resume operations
during a strike with a substitute labor force have claimed that the im-
possibility of complying with agreements tailored to more sophisti-
cated employees should free them from the RLA's procedures. 93 In
response, courts have granted the carrier a closely confined and
supervised power to make "reasonable and necessary changes," but
have required it to "respect the continuing status of the collective bar-
gaining agreement."" 4 This compromise approach better effectuates
the policies of the RLA than the unilateral rejection of the entire con-
tract authorized in REA Express.
C. The Debtor-in-Possession as a Successor Employer
Wholly apart from considerations of conflicting statutory lan-
guage is the question of whether the debtor-in-possession is a succes-
" 7 Nor is the conflict averted by reliance on 	 77(n) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C. § 205(n) (1070), which immunizes the wages and working conditions of "railroad
employees" from unilateral change by a bankruptcy judge or trustee. The RLA applies
to the employees of "carriers," a broader class than "railroad employees" protected by
section 77(n), At least one court has not recognized the distinction. In re Overseas Nat'l
Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 360, 58 L.R.R.M. 2427, 2427-28 (E.D.N,Y. 1965).
" Burke v. Murphy, 109 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 635 (1940).
'1 ° In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 347 F. Supp., 1356, 1367 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
"° 523 F.2d at 170 n.5, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2583 n.5.
"I Thus, reliance on Kevin Steel was inappropriate because the RLA directs its
contract termination restrictions to "carriers" rather than "parties." Nevertheless, the
"party" language was cited by the court in flE4 Express, 523 F.2d at 170, 90 L.R.R.M. at
2582-83.
"' 523 F.2d. at 167, 90 L.R.R.M, at 2580.
"3 Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v, Florida E. Coast Ry., 384 U.S. 238, 245-46
(1966).
"4 Id. at 246, 248.
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sor employer." Courts have discounted the need to develop abstract
definitions of successorship because the concrete question of a new
employer's legal obligations varies from case to case according to the
particular labor policies and legal obligation at issue." However, the
threshold criterion to a finding of successorship generally has been
continuity of identity in the business enterprise, 97 which, in turn, has
two aspects: substantial continuity of the workforce across the change
in ownership" and similarity in the employing industry." Because it
does not affect the finding of similarity in the employing industry,
courts previously have found the manner in which the new employer
assumes control of the enterprise to be irrelevant.'°° "The refusal to
adopt a mode of analysis [distinguishing] among mergers, consolida-
tions and purchases of assets is attributable to the fact that, so long as
there is continuity in the 'employing industry,' the public policies un-
derlying the doctrine will be served by its broad application.""' Thus,
the debtor-in-possession who continues the debtor's business and hires
all or most of its employees satisfies the threshold requirements of
continuity in the business enterprise.
The next question is the extent of the duties imposed by succes-
sorship principles on debtors-in-possession. Successorship has arisen
in four contexts: duty to bargain, 1 °" duty to remedy unfair labor
practices,'" duty to arbitrate' 04 and duty to adhere to the substantive
terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 1 U 5 Although Kevin Steel
discussed three of these duties,"° neither it nor REA Express men-
tioned the duty to arbitrate. The court in both Kevin Steel and REA
"s The analogy is not an original one. It has been suggested previously that the
rejection or modification of collective bargaining agreements of a bankrupt corporation
should be governed by principles developed in the labor law of successorship. See
Comment, Collective Bargaining and Bankruptcy, 42 S. CAL L. REV. 477, 490-91 (1969).
" Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249,
262-63 n.9 (1974); see Acheson v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 523 F.2d 1327, 1329, 90
L.R.R.M. 2333, 2334 (9th Cir. 1975).
" 7 See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249,
263-64 (1974); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964).
93 Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive lid., 417 U.S. 249, 263
(1974).
"" Perma Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 968, 969, 65 L.R.R.M. 1168, 1169 (1967),
enforced sub nom. United States Pipe and Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544, 68
L.R.R.M. 2913 (5th Cir. 1968); see United Steelworkers of America v. United States
Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713, 726, 85 L.R.R.M. 2962, 2971 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied per
curiam, 498 F.2d 334,87 L.R.R.M. 2075 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998, re'hg denied,
419 U.S. 1097 (1974).
1 " See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182-83 n.5 (1973). But
see Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 257 (1974).
lot Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182-83 n.5 (1973).
1 °2 NLRB v. Geronimo Serv. Co., 467 F.2d 903, 81 L.R.R.M. 2407, 2408 (10th
Cir. 1972).
1113 Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 171 (1973).
1 0 4 Wiley, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964).
105 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 285 (1972).
1 °° 519 F.2d at 704, 705 n.20, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3137, 3138 n.20.
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Express did recognize the debtor-in-possession's obligation to bargain
collectively with the union.' 07 However, the court in Kevin Steel ex-
plicitly noted that it was not deciding whether the debtor-in-possession
had a duty to remedy the debtor's unfair labor practices, even though
there was an outstanding judgment of unfair labor practices against
the Company.'"
Kevin Steel also concluded that because the debtor-in-possession
was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement it did not have
a duty to adhere to the agreement's substantive terms."'" In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied on the principles of successorship law
which militate against binding a successor employer to his
predecessor's contract. 10 Indeed, the court reasoned that declaring
the debtor-in-possession a party to the outstanding labor contract
would leave it in a worse position than a successor.'" Similarly, the
court in REA Express relied on NLRB v. Burns International Security Ser-
vices, Inc. 12 to support its conclusion that the debtor-in-possession was
not obligated to adhere to the terms of the existing labor agreement
pending negotiations. 13 The court found the Burns principles particu-
larly applicable to the arrangement setting." 4
In Burns, the predecessor, whose service contract had expired,
was succeeded by Burns International Security Services, the low bid-
der for the new contract." 3 The Supreme Court held that while
Burns had a duty to bargain with the predecessor's union, it did not
follow that the successor employer also had the duty to adhere to the
substantive terms of the collective bargaining agreement.'" Both
economic and labor policies led to this result.
A potential employer may be willing to take over a
moribund business only if he can make changes in corpo-
rate structure, composition of the labor force, work loca-
tion, task assignment, and nature of supervision. Saddling
such an employer with the ... old collective bargaining
contract may make these changes impossible and may dis-
courage ... the transfer of capital.'"
Similarly, the labor policy of free collective bargaining precluded
compelling a party to adhere to substantive contractual obligations.' 10
`" Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3137; REA Express, 523 F.2d at
170, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2583.
"" 519 F.2d at 706 6.20, 89 1...R.R.M. at 3138 n.20.
1 "" See id. at 704, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3137.
tit Id.
" 2 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
113
 523 F.2d at 170, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2583.
"' 406 U.S. at 275.
1 " Id. at 281-82.
11 " Id. at 287-88.
' 1 " See id, at 282-83.
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In Burns, the Court found that these considerations outweighed the
labor policy of preventing industrial strife which might result from
the abrogation of an existing collective bargaining agreement.'"
The Court distinguished"" John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston"'
where the successor had been required to arbitrate under the
predecessor's contract."' Wiley arose out of a merger situation where
state law imposed the obligations of the disappearing corporation on
the survivor of the merger. 125 In contrast, Burns did not involve a sale
of assets or any other commercial transactions between the successor
and predecessor. 124
The REA Express and Kevin Steel courts' reliance on the Burns
principles was well-placed. In fact, the economic policies against im-
posing a duty to adhere to the substantive terms of the agreement are
even more compelling in the arrangement situation. Bunts favored
maximizing a more efficient owner's freedom to rearrange a marginal
enterprise. 125 In an arrangement, the transfer to the debtor-in-
possession is not simply a matter of fostering a greater relative effi-
ciency. Rather, the transfer is a response to the extreme situation of
an enterprise on the brink of total failure.
Furthermore, unlike the Burns situation, the rights of creditors
are involved in arrangement proceedings. In Burns, the predecessor
and successor were competitors, bidding for the same contract.' 2 "
When the predecessor's contract expired, the rights of its creditors
presumably were unaffected. In contrast, the practical effect of an ar-
rangement is to force all creditors of' the debtor to renegotiate their
rights. 127 As the court noted in REA Express, there is no reason why a
union should be permitted to insist on strict compliance with its collec-
tive bargaining agreement, thereby further weakening the position of
the creditors. 128
In conclusion, blind enforcement of the labor policy of protect-
ing employees from sudden changes in the employment
relationship' 29 may be counterproductive in an arrangement situation.
Requiring the debtor-in-possession to assume the entire outstanding
collective bargaining agreement might trigger the collapse of the en-
terprise thereby foreclosing altogether the possibility of further
employment."" Thus, the policy considerations against saddling the
1 " See id. at 285.
1291d. at 285-86.
121 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
122 1d. at 548.
123 Id. at 547-48.
' 24 Id. at 286.
12 Id. at 287-88.
' 26 Id. at 275.
1 " REA Express, 523 F.2d at 169, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2582.
"" Id. at 169-70, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2582. Partial compliance provides a more equit-
able alternative. See text at note 196 infra.
1 " Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549.
"° REA Express, 523 F.2d at 170-71, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2583.
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debtor-in-possession with the substantive terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement parallel those of Burns and it appears that the
court's conclusion with regard to this particular duty was correct.
11. SECTION 313(1) OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
The second section of this note will examine section 313(I) of
the Bankruptcy Act, first enacted in 1938 as part of the Chandler
Amendments, 13 ' to determine whether it authorizes the rejection of
collective bargaining agreements as "executory contracts." 132
A. Kevin Steel's Analysis of Section 313(1)
The Kevin Steel court first examined the literal breadth Of section
313(1) and determined that the statutory language, permitting rejec-
tion of the debtor's "executory contracts," on its face encompassed col-
lective bargaining agreements.' 33 While Congress has used the broad
term "contracts," in other contexts, to include collective bargaining
agreements,' 34 Kevin Steel's rationale for here adopting the inclusive
reacting in the face of conflicting labor policies is not persuasive. The
court found precedent for a literal reaching of the Bankruptcy Act in
United States v. Embassy Restaurant." 5 In that case, the Supreme Court
interpreted the section according priority to "wages ... clue to
workmen" 13" literally to exclude various fringe - benefits."' But
Embassy Restaurant is not strictly analogous to Kevin Steel and therefore
does not mandate the broad literal interpretation of "executory con-
tracts" to include labor agreements. The Supreme Court expressly in-
dicated that it resolved the issue of priority within the confines of the
Bankruptcy Act and was not interpreting the NLRA, 138 whereas Kevin
Steel construed both statutes to avoid irreconcilable conflict. In actual-
ity, section 2 (15) of the Bankruptcy Act'"" serves as a, more appro-
priate analogy because its construction necessarily involves interpreta-
tion of a countervailing labor statute. A leading authority has sug-
gested that this section, which gives the reorganization court authority
to issue injunctions in protection of its exclusive jurisdiction of the
debtor and its property, should be interpreted narrowly in view of' the'
131 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575 § 313(1), 52 Stat. 840, us amended, I t U.S.C.
713(1) (1970). The relevant portion of section 31'3(1) is quoted at note 4 supra.
132 In In re San Francisco Bay Expo., 50 F. Stipp, 344, 347 (N.D. Cal. 1943), the
court defined "executory contracts" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act as those
which call for performance in fiduro. The term is nowhere defined within the Act.
E" 519 F.2d at 703, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3136.
1 " Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970),
provides that "suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation ... may be brought in any district court ...."
133 359 U.S. 29 (1959).
13" Bankruptcy Act § 64(a), 11 U.S.C. II 104(a) (1970).
137 359 U.S. at 35.
133 Id. at 33.
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Norris-LaGuardia Aces"° restrictions on labor injunctions."' Simi-
larly, section 313(1) should be interpreted narrowly to exclude collec-
tive bargaining agreements.
Kevin Steel next examined the implications of section 77(n) of the
Bankruptcy Act' 42 which prohibits any bankruptcy judge or trustee
from changing the wages or working conditions of railroad employees
except in the manner prescribed in the RLA. The district court
adopted the NLRB's position that section 77(n) evidenced a congres-
sional policy toward labor agreements generally, rather than an intent
"to make seemingly irrelevant distinctions between different kinds of
labor agreements." 1 A 3 Therefore, the lower court concluded that sec-
tion 313(1) should be read to include an implied exception for all col-
lective bargaining agreements.'" However, the court of appeals re-
jected this approach on two grounds. First, the congressional concep-
tion of the special character of railroads, highlighted by differences
between the NLRA and the RLA, did not warrant the extension to
labor generally of Bankruptcy Act provisions tailored to railroad
employees. 148
 Second, in light of the close scrutiny given the Bank-
ruptcy Act by Congress, the court considered it unlikely that "legisla-
tive oversight" accounted for the absence of a similar exception for
labor generally. 146 Furthermore, the court determined that only the
legislature should remedy the "oversight" where the remedy affected
two important statutes."'
However, while section 77(n) does not necessarily evidence con-
gressional policy toward labor generally, it is suggested that the failure
to include a similar exception for all labor likewise does not indicate
an affirmative legislative intent to authorize rejection of all other col-
lective bargaining agreements. It seems more reasonable to confine
the interpretative ramifications of section 77(n) to section 77, 198 which
deals solely with the reorganization of railroads. The legislative history
indicates that Congress enacted section 77(n) in response to the fail-
ure of equity receivers to comply with the provisions of the RLA.' 49
In effect, section 77(n) incorporates the RLA by reference. It does not
carve out, as Kevin Steel suggested,'" an exception to a general power
in
 11 U.S.C. § 11 (15) (1970).
"° 29 U.S.C. § 101-115 (1970).
1 " 6 COLI.IER ON BANKRUPTCY. 309111, 479.81 n.17 (14th ed. 1972).
" 2 11 U.S.C. § 205(n) (1970).
'" Iron Workers Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 336, 338, 87
L.R.R.M. 231 l, 2313 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
1 " See id.
"5 519 F.2d at 705, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3138.
"'See id.
'' Id.
148 I 1	 § 205(n) (1970).
' 4° 76 Cong. Rec. 2927 (1933) (remarks of Senator LaGuardia). Section 77 was
passed in 1933 and not reconsidered when Congress enacted the Chandler Amend-
ments. Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1474.
"° 519 F.2d at 704, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3137.
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to reject collective bargaining agreements as "executory contracts."
Within the framework of section 77 there is no interrelationship be-
tween subsection (n) and subsection (b)(5) 1 " which authorizes the
reorganization plan to provide for the rejection of "contracts of the
debtor which are executory in whole or in part." Its implications,
therefore, are less conclusive.than would have been the case had the
relevant section permitted the unilateral rejection of all the railroad's,
contracts, except those with its employees. Thus, it is submitted that the
absence of a similar provision for labor generally does not suggest an
intent. to authorize the rejection of collective bargaining agreements,
because the presence of section 77(n) does not indicate that bank-
ruptcy courts otherwise possessed such authority.
In summary, then, there is no conclusive evidence that Congress,
in enacting section 313(1), intended to provide for the cancellation of
collective bargaining agreements. Nor is there any indication of an in-
tent to protect. labor agreements from the reach of section 313(1).
Therefore, it is submitted that courts should look both to relevant
labor legislation and the common law for guidance in the proper
treatment of collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy because
they offer solutions consistent with the rehabilitation of an enterprise
in an arrangement and with the special character' 52
 of collective bar-
gaining agreements.
B. The Sul Generis Nature of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
In previous cases dealing with the rejection of collective bargain-
ing agreements in bankruptcy, the argument as to the breadth of sec-
tion 313(1) focused on the issue of whether a collective bargaining
agreement is sui generis and not a "contract" within the meaning of
the statutory language.'" Though many authorities, in different con-
texts, have asserted that collective bargaining agreements are
unique,"' the district courts generally have not distinguished between
collective bargaining agreements and other executory contracts under
section 313(1)." 5
 The Kevin Steel court alluded to this issue only in
passing. The court accepted the premise that collective bargaining
agreements are unique, but not the conclusion that Congress there-
151 11 U.S.C.	 205(h)(5) (1970).
152 See text at notes 153-78 infra.
1 " See cases cited at note 155 infra.
Im
 See generally Cox, The Legal Nature q/ Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57
MICH. L. REV. I (1958); Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HA RV.
L. Mit', 999 (1955). Fur the suggestion that Burns represented a reversal of this trend,
see Morris & Gaus, Successorship and the Collective Bargaining Agreement: Accomodating
Wiley and Burns, 59 VA. L. Rt.v, 1359, 1386-87 (1973).
1 " See In re Business Supplies Corp. ()I' America, 72 CCH Lab. Cas. 	 13, 940, at
27,978 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Carpenters Local 2746 v. Turney Wood Prods., Inc., 289 F.
Supp. 143, 147, 69 L.R.R.M. 2977, 2980 (W.D. Ark. 1968); In re Overseas Nat'l Air-
ways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 361, 58 L.R.R.M. 2427, 2429 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
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fore could not have intended that the provision for the rejection of
contracts apply to them.'"
However, this issue deserves more consideration. The 1938
Chandler Amendments preceded both the enactment of section 8(d)
of the NLRA 157 dealing with termination of a collective bargaining
agreement by a party and the landmark Supreme Court cases distin-
guishing collective bargaining agreements from ordinary contracts.' 58
As a result, the literal terms of section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act
must be accommodated to the subsequent relevant law: "Statutory in-
terpretation requires more than concentration upon isolated words;
rather, consideration must be given to the total corpus of pertinent
law and the policies that inspired ostensibly inconsistent provisions." 15 "
The Supreme Court began distinguishing collective bargaining
agreements from ordinary contracts of employment in the 1944 deci-
sion of J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB,'" where it likened a collective bargain-
ing agreement to a comprehensive trade agreement or tariffs estab-
lished by a carrier. 18 ' Subsequently, in 1947, Congress enacted section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act'" to provide for suits in
federal court for "violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization."'" The Supreme Court, in Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills 164 interpreted section '301 as not only a grant of jurisdic-
tion, but also a mandate to develop substantive federal labor law.'"
Thus, in Lincoln Mills, the Court severed the law of collective bargain-
ing agreements from that of ordinary contracts.'"John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. v. Livingston' 67 further widened the distinction. The Supreme
Court there required the successor to arbitrate under the
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement, recognizing that ordi-
nary contract principles would not bind an unconsenting successor to
the prior agreement.'"
Beyond the simple breadth of the statutory language, there is no
conclusive evidence that Congress intended to authorize the rejection
of labor agreements under section 313(1). Therefore, the sui generis
nature of a collective bargaining agreement should prevail in the
bankruptcy context as well and prevent the rejection of labor agree-
"8 519 F.2d at 704, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3137.
182 Act cilium 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 8(d), 61 Stat. 142; see note 17 supra.
1S8
 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550; United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-45
(1944); cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 948, 456-57 (1956).
1S8 Boys Mkts. Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970).
' 60 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
'°' id. at 334-35. See generally Morris & Gaus, supra note 154, at 1361-64.
182 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
'" Id. § 185(a).
1 " 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
188 Id, at 456-57.
' 6° See id. at 456-57; Morris & Gaus, supra note 154, at 1362-63.
18r
	 U.S. 543 (1964).
166 1d. at 550.
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ments as "executory contracts." The character of a collective bargain-
ing agreement as a tariff agreement—"a generalized code to govern a
myriad of cases" 9---is completely inconsistent with the scheme of
statutory remedies provided by the Bankruptcy Act for any person in-
jured by the rejection of an executory contract.'" The statutory rem-
edies triggered by the rejection of "executory contracts" are tailored
only to those contracts which translate easily, on breach, into money
damages. However, collective bargaining agreement is an effort to
erect a system of industrial self-government."'" Money damages are
inadequate relief for its collapse which affects the intangible rights' 72
of employees in many shops; a result far more radical than the rela-
tively simple renegotiation of rights undertaken by all creditors in an
arrangement proceeding. Nor, as the Kevin Steel court suggested," 3
do other sections of the Bankruptcy Act redress this imbalance. Sec-
tion 64(a)(2) gives priority to "wages not to exceed $600 to each
claimant ... earned within three months before ... the commence-
ment of the proceeding ...." 174
 Section 17(a)(5) lists wages earned
within the last three months as a debt not affected by a discharge." 5
While these sections provide some relief for the rejection of a simple
employment contract, they do not compensate for the non-monetary
aspects of a collective bargaining agreement such as seniority or pen-
sion rights. Moreover, the section according priority has been inter-
preted very narrowly.'"
Similarly, extra-statutory protection does not compensate for the
inadequacy of statutory remedies. The strike is not necessarily a prac-
tical limitation on the employer's termination of an existing labor con-
tract. The paucity of cases on the subject"' may reflect the unions' re-
straint and willingness to accept new terms, rather than the em-
ployers' caution ,
 in the face of a possible strike. In addition, even if
the union did take this risk of toppling the enterprise, there is some
indication that the bankruptcy court, despite the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, might issue an injunction to protect its exclusive jurisdiction over
the debtor and its property." 8
''" United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578-79 (1960).
vr° Bankruptcy Act § 353, 11 U.S.C. § 753 (1970) provides that any person in-
jured by the rejection of an executory contract shall be deemed a creditor for the pur-
poses of an arrangement.
"I United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav, Co., 363 U.S. 574,
580 (1960).
"2
 Courts have been particularly concerned with the loss of employees' intangible
rights. See Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 707, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3139, citing In re Overseas Nat'l
Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 361-62, 58 L.R.R.M. 2427, 2429 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
13 519 F.2d at 703-04, 89 L.R.R.M, at 3137.
1 " 11 U.S.C.	 104(a)(2).
"3 1d. § 35(a)(5).
' " Embassy Restaurant, 359 U.S. at 35.
'" See cases cited at note 52 supra,
'" See In re Cleveland & Sandusky Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 198, 207 (N.D. Ohio
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In summary, then, the statutory framework for the rejection of
"executory contracts" is inconsistent with the very nature of collective
bargaining agreements. In light of this inconsistency, courts should
require more conclusive evidence of legislative intent before interpret-
ing section 313(1) to provide for the rejection of collective bargaining
agreements in bankruptcy.
III. POSSIBLE RESOLUTIONS OF THE LABOR-BANKRUPTCY
POLICY CONFLICT
Assuming that the debtor-in-possession should not be bound to
all the substantive terms of the debtor's collective bargaining
agreement,'" several alternatives to total rejection are open to a court
attempting to resolve carefully the conflict between labor and bank-
ruptcy policies in the context of a Chapter XI arrangement proceed-
ing. A court might: (1) require the debtor-in-possession to arbitrate
the extent to which it should be bound under the debtor's collective
bargaining agreement; (2) allow the bankruptcy judge to give differ-
ent treatment to different parts of the agreement by creating an im-
plied exception for collective bargaining agreements to the rule' 8 ° that
contracts may only be assumed or rejected in toto in bankruptcy; or (3)
assuming such an implied exception is not created, establish a dis-
cretionary test to determine those situations in which the bankruptcy
court should permit the rejection of the entire collective bargaining
agreement.
Neither Kevin Steel nor REA Express considered the possible im-
position of the duty to arbitrate. 1 e' The first alternative—requiring
the debtor-in-possession to arbitrate the extent to which it is bound
under the debtor's collective bargaining agreement—is suggested by a
full exploration of the successorship analogy. In Wiley, the Supreme
Court, relying on the central role played by arbitration in effectuating
national labor policy,'" held that the disappearance by merger of the
corporate employer did not automatically terminate all rights of em-
ployees under the existing labor agreement.' 83
 Instead, in appropriate
1935). But see 6 COLLIER'ON BANKRUPTCY, T 309[1], at 479.81 n.17 (14th ed. 1972); text
at notes 139-41 supra.
"S This conclusion follows from successorship principles, discussed in text at
notes 109-130 supra.
1" 8 COI.LIER ON BANKRUPTCY. 3.15171 at 206 (14th ed. 1975); cf. Schokbeton
Indus., Inc. v. Schokbeton Prods. Corp., 466 F.2d 171, 175 (5th Cir. 1972).
I"
 This may have been because the unions in both cases framed the question of
contract survival too categorically. See generally Morris & Gaus, supra note 154, at
1379-80. Thus, they might have done better to argue the middle ground: that the
debtor-in-possession was obligated, not to assume the entire collective bargaining
agreement, but to arbitrate the extent to which he was bound by it. But see Local 30,
ILGWU v. Hers Apparel Indus., Inc., 2 BANKR. L. REP. 11 65,725, at 75,435-36 (S.D.N.Y,
1975).
1"
 376 U.S. at 549-50.
'" Id. at 548.
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circumstances,'" the Court would require the successor to arbitrate
under the agreement of its predecessor.'" Wiley has continuing
vitality'" despite the holding in Burns that the NLRB may not bind a
successor employer to its predecessor's contract terms.'" Significantly,
Burns has not been interpreted as vitiating the central role of the ar-
bitral process in effectuating national labor policy.'" Furthermore,
the transfer to a debtor-in-possession in an arrangement is more
comparable to the situation in Wiley than in Burns because the em-
ployer, as well as the employees, participate, however passively, in the
transaction. 1 e" Thus, Wiley may serve as analogous precedent for re-
quiring arbitration in the arrangement situation where the debtor-
predecessor in effect has disappeared as an effective employer by los-
ing all control to the debtor-in-possession.
Significant benefits would follow from requiring arbitration in
the arrangement context. An arbitrator has a degree of flexibility pos-
sessed neither by the NLRB nor by the bankruptcy court.' 9° This ar-
bitral flexibility could protect the rights of labor without unduly con-
straining the rehabilitation efforts of the debtor-in-possession.
Moreover, successorship arbitration is particularly flexible. In ordinary
arbitration, the arbitrator uses his own knowledge of the enterprise
and the bargaining history of the collective bargaining agreement to
cover gaps in the contract."' But, in the successorship situation the
arbitrator may find that equities inherent in changed circumstances
require an award ... at variance with some term or terms of that
contract."'"
The arbitrator, then, being sensitive to the nature of a collective
bargaining agreement as an instrument of self-government, could af-
ford the unions more protection than they presently receive under
section 353 of the Bankruptcy Act."' For example, lie could revamp
184 These circumstances were present in Wiley, which involved a merger situation
in which the predecessor corporation disappeared into the merged corporation. The
requisite similarity and continuity of operation across the change of ownership was evi-
denced by the wholesale transfer of employees from the predecessor to the successor
corporation. 376 U.S. at 551.
M kt at 548.
l " See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249,
256 (1974); United Steelworkers or America v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d
713, 726, 85 L.R.R.M. 2962, 2971-72 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied per curiam, 498 F.2d 334, 87
L.R.R.M. 2075 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 998, reh'g denied 419 U.S. 1097 (1974);
19741 975 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 16 B.C.
& Coat. L. RE:V. 965, 1025-30 (1975).
1 " Burns, 406 U.S. at 291.
' 8" United States Gypsum, 492 F.2d at 726, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2971-72.
16} See generally St. Antoine, Judicial Caution and the Supreme Court's Labor Decisions,
October Term 1971, 6 U. Micit. J.L. REF, 269, 275 (1973).
'°" See id. at 727, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2972.
"" Morris & Gaus, supra note 154, at 1377-78.
I " United Steelworkers of America v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891,
895, 56 L.R.R.M. 2721, 2723 (3d Cir. 1964).
I"
 I 1 U.S.C. § 753 (1970). See text at notes 169-76 supra.
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those portions of the collective bargaining agreement whose survival
would impede the rehabilitation efforts of the debtor-in-possession,
while retaining others, such as seniority provisions, in accordance with
the equities of the situation. Thus, requiring the debtor-in-possession
to arbitrate would reconcile the conflicting labor and bankruptcy
policies more equitably than allowing the rejection of the entire con-
tract under section 313(1).
There are, however, drawbacks to requiring arbitration in the
arrangement situation. These stem from bifurcating the responsibility
between the arbitrator and the bankruptcy court for the renegotiation
of the debtor's liabilities. This may result, for example, in unnecessary
duplication in a situation where time may be of the essence to an en-
terprise on the brink of disaster." 4
 Furthermore, it may add an ele-
ment of uncertainty to a situation in which it is crucial for both the
bankruptcy court and the arbitrator to appraise accurately the finan-
cial status of the debtor-in-possession. It is difficult for either the
bankruptcy court or the arbitrator to proceed without knowing the
full impact of the other's actions.
Nevertheless, these difficulties may be less problematic than first
appears for two reasons. First, the arbitrator could bind the debtor-
in-possession only where consistent with the rehabilitation of the en-
terprise, thus affecting the bankruptcy court's renegotiation of the
debtor's other liabilities only indirectly. Second, the arbitrator who de-
cides which substantive terms of a collective bargaining agreement are
binding on the debtor-in-possession creates no more uncertainty or
practical problems for the bankruptcy court than are already inherent
in the arrangement situation. It should be remembered that the en-
terprise continues operations during an arrangement. Thus, even
where the entire collective bargaining agreement is rejected, the par-
ties will be bargaining to arrive at the terms of a labor agreement
which will be put into effect during the arrangement. Furthermore,
there is authority for the proposition that the debtor-in-possession
may enter into certain collective bargaining agreements without the
authorization of the bankruptcy court.'• As a result, even where ar-
bitration is not imposed, the efforts of the bankruptcy court and the
creditors may be subject to the uncertain impact of an unauthorized
and newly negotiated collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the dis-
advantages to requiring arbitration in the arrangement context appear
minimal in comparison with the benefit of advancing important na-
tional labor policies.
`a 4 See REA Express, 523 F.2d at 170-71, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2583.
"s In re Wil-low Cafeterias, 111 F.2c1 429, 431 (2d Cir. 1940). See also Wolf v.
Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633. The Court there cites In re Wil-low Cafeterias for the proposi-
tion that "the salary of a non-officer employee need not even be approved in advance of
his employment." 372 U.S. at 648-49 n.14 (emphasis in original). However, courts will
not recognize contracts made by a debtor-in-possession outside the authority conferred
upon him. In re Avorn Dress Co., 79 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1935). Thus, the bankruptcy
court could avoid this problem by requiring specific approval of labor agreements.
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A second possible means of resolving the conflict between labor
and bankruptcy policies involves creating an implied exception for col-
lective bargaining agreements to the general rule"' that, in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, contracts must be cancelled in their entirety or
not at all. At least one commentator has suggested the possibility that
different provisions of a collective bargaining agreement might de-
serve different treatment by the bankruptcy court.'`" In practical ef-
fect, this alternative parallels the imposition of arbitration in that both
approaches result in the retention of some and the rejection of other
substantive provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The
major difference is that under the first alternative, the arbitrator
makes this determination, whereas, under the second, this responsibil-
ity is assumed by the bankruptcy judge. Allowing the bankruptcy
judge to decide which provisions survive would have two possible ad-
vantages over the imposition of arbitration.
It is arguable that the imposition of a duty to arbitrate would be
more directly in conflict with the literal statutory language. Arbitra-
tion implies that the contract itself survives.'"" This notion of contract
survival conflicts with the concept of "rejection" authorized under sec-
tion 313(1). This conflict is avoided under the .second alternative
which merely suggests that some of the contract's substantive provi-
sions, and not the contract itself, carry over into the arrangement
situation. Furthermore, allowing the bankruptcy judge to decide
which provisions carry. over avoids the problem of splitting this re-
sponsibility between the arbitrator and the bankruptcy court.
Nevertheless, neither of the above arguments seems sufficiently
compelling to derogate from the central role played by arbitration in
effectuating national labor policy.'" Nor do they overcome a chief
disadvantage—the loss of the arbitrator's experience and sensitivity to
the bargaining history of the enterprise. Therefore, the imposition of
a duty to arbitrate seems preferable.
A third alternative assumes that the Bankruptcy Act authorizes
the rejection of collective bargaining agreements only in their entirety,
and attempts to define the circumstances under which that authority
should be exercised. This was the approach taken in both Kevin Steel
and REA Express, though neither court considered the foregoing al-
ternatives. The court in Kevin Steel stressed that the rejection decision
should not be based solely on whether it will improve the financial
condition of the debtor.'" The Union there advocated that the bank-
ruptcy judge should require, prior to weighing the equities against re-
jection: (1) a showing that the employer's motive is not simply to rid
"" See note 180 supra.
'" Winner, Collective Labor Agreements is the Courts, 48 YALE L.J. 195, 223 (1938).
""" As the duty to arbitrate is founded on a contract, "a compulsory submission to
arbitration cannot precede judicial determination that the collective bargaining agree-
ment does in fact create such a duty." Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547, 550.
'" See Wiley, 37611.S. at 549-50.
so" 519 F.2d at 707, 89 L. R. R.M. at 3139.
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itself of the Union; (2) "convincing proof of the company's financial
condition"; and (3) evidence as to the source of the company's finan-
cial difficulties. 20 ' The court impliedly adopted these considerations as
the test for allowing rejection on remand. 202
The test for allowing rejection set forth by the REA Express court
had an even higher threshold: rejection should be authorized "only
where it clearly appears to be the lesser of two evils and that, unless
the agreement is rejected, the carrier will collapse .... 203
The tests advanced in Kevin Steel and REA Express as standards
for allowing rejection represent substantial advances over previous
holdings, many of which did not articulate appropriate
considerations,'" or spoke only vaguely of the need to balance
equities. 205
 It is submitted that the difficulty in assessing the presence
of an improper motive under the Kevin Steel test may be overcome by
adopting the stricter REA Express test, which minimizes such consider-
ations. However, even the stricter REA Express test may be a reconcili-
ation of the conflicting policies in name only, and, in fact, offer little
protection to a union. For example, it is significant that no court since
the Chandler Amendments has refused to find that a labor agreement
was sufficiently onerous to warrant rejection. 2" Furthermore, it will
be difficult for the unions to rebut the employer's evidence of
economic plight, particularly as the successorship analogy may induce
bankruptcy courts to apply loosely the REA Express standard in view
of persistent judicial refusa1 207 to bind the successor to the substantive
terms of his predecessor's labor agreement. Similarly, a charitable
reading of this standard seems likely in view of the inflexibility of the
alternative. If contract survival is an all-or-nothing proposition, the
bankruptcy court will be predisposed to authorize its rejection because
of the likelihood that adherence to all the terms of the contract will
impede the arrangement. 2 " Thus, the discretionary standards set
forth in Kevin Steel and REA Express afford labor uncertain protection.
In the absence of more affirmative evidence that the Bankruptcy Act
" 1 Id. The Union argued for this standard against a background of pre-
bankruptcy unfair labor practices committed by Kevin Steel. However, this does not
mean that the courts will refuse to give the standard more general application. For ex-
ample, in REA Express, where there was no issue of unfair labor practices, the court
adopted a more stringent standard. See text at note 203 infra.
"'See id.
203
 523 F.2d at 172, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2584.
2°' See, e.g., In re Business Supplies Corp. of America, 72 CCH Lab. Cas.
13,940, at 27,979 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Carpenters Local 2746 v. Turney Wood Prods., Inc.,
289 F. Supp. 143, 149, 69 L.R.R.M. 2977, 2980 (W.D. Ark. 1968); In re Klaber Bros.,
173 F. Supp. 83, 85, 44 L.R.R.M. 2176, 2177-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
2 ° 5 E.g., In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 361-62, 58 L.R.R.M.
2427, 2429 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
200 See note 52 supra.
207 See text at notes 115-24 supra.
2°a
	 avoid this problem, the bankruptcy court could apply the standard strin-




authorizes the rejection of entire collective bargaining agreements, the
imposition of a duty to arbitrate seems preferable because it allows a
more even balance of the competing labor and bankruptcy policies.
The arbitrator, far from detracting ,from the rehabilitation efforts of
the debtor-in-possession, may in fact make a positive contribution
which facilitates the rehabilitation of the enterprise. 209
CONCLUSION
In both Kevin Steel and REA Express, a debtor-in-possession in
Chapter XI arrangement proceedings petitioned the bankruptcy court
for permission to reject the debtor's collective bargaining agreements.
Three central questions were presented: (1) may a bankruptcy judge
permit the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement without
creating direct conflict with the contract termination restrictions of the
relevant labor legislation; (2) does section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy
Act clearly authorize the cancellation of collective bargaining agree-
ments; and (3) what constitutes the most equitable reconciliation of
the competing labor and bankruptcy policies.
Both cases avoided the problem of direct conflict between the
Bankruptcy Act and the applicable labor statute. Kevin Steel concluded
that the debtor-in-possession was not a "party" subject to the contract
termination restrictions in section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations
Act. Similarly, REA Express determined that the literal statutory defini-
tion of "carrier" should not apply to the debtor-in-possession because
its application would defeat the central purposes of the Railway Labor
Act. Each court then buttressed its reasoning by analogizing to succes-
sorship principles, which have precluded binding an unconsenting
successor to the substantive terms of its predecessor's collective bar-
gaining agreement. In view of the peculiar status of the debtor who
continues in possession during an arrangement and the clear rele-
vance of successorship principles, the court's conclusion that a bank-
ruptcy judge may permit the rejection of a labor contract without
creating direct conflict with the NLRA appears correct. The result
under the RLA is more tenuous.
Both cases also concluded that section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy
Act, which permits the rejection of the debtor's "executory contracts,"
authorizes the cancellation of his collective bargaining agreements. It
appears that the evidence of legislative intent is; however, far less
clear than was suggested by the courts. In effect, the decisions amount
to little more than a , determination to read the statutory language lit-
erally in the absence of any indications that a different interpretation
was intended. It is suggested, however, that developments after the
enactment of section 313(1), which draw ever-wider distinctions be-
tween contracts and collective bargaining agreements, point to the il-
2" See text at notes 190-193 supra.
215
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
logic of treating collective bargaining agreements as "executory con-
tracts" under section 313(1).
Finally, Kevin Steel and REA Express each established a standard
to guide the district court on remand in its determination of whether
the bankruptcy court had properly exercised the authority to reject
the collective bargaining agreement. Neither court discussed two pos-
sible alternatives: requiring the debtor-in-possession to arbitrate the
extent to which he was bound by the debtor's labor agreement, or al-
lowing the bankruptcy judge to give different treatment to different
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, rejecting some and
causing others to survive. It is suggested that a full examination of the
successorship analogy would indicate that the imposition of a duty to
arbitrate provides the most equitable resolution of the competing
labor and bankruptcy policies.
It is unlikely, however, that courts will venture from the previ-
ous trend in the district courts, which have freely allowed the rejec-
tion of collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy. Thus, courts
probably will follow Kevin Steel and REA Express, whose standards for
the exercise of the court's discretion may prove to afford labor insuf-
ficient protection and may, in turn, tempt employers to use arrange-
ment proceedings as a vehicle for divesting themselves of troublesome
labor contracts.
ALEXANDRA LEAKE
216
